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CAUGHT IN THE ECONOMIC CROSSHAIRS:  
SECONDARY SANCTIONS, BLOCKING 




Economic sanctions have a long tradition of use in American foreign 
policy.  There are many benefits to using economic sanctions, particularly 
when policymakers employ them as alternatives to military action.  
Secondary sanctions developed as a relatively new tool intended to extend 
the reach and potency of economic sanctions.  They function in much the 
same manner as traditional, or primary, sanctions.  However, they target 
individuals and entities who conduct prohibited business with the targets of 
primary economic sanctions.  Secondary sanctions are often accompanied 
by severe financial penalties and threats of exclusion from U.S. consumer 
and financial markets. 
Through secondary sanctions, the United States can ensure the rest of the 
world complies with its foreign policy objectives even if they are not 
necessarily shared by the rest of the world.  The Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, the agency that administers the American sanctions regime, has 
shown little regard for America’s allies when punishing individuals or 
entities for noncompliance with secondary sanctions. 
In response to American secondary sanctions, Europe has enacted a series 
of blocking regulations intended to punish any European individual or entity 
that alters an intended course of action in order to comply with American 
sanctions.  These blocking regulations were intended to counteract American 
influence on European companies operating in the American markets.  
Ultimately, however, the conflicting regimes have left individuals and entities 
in a precarious legal position where dual compliance is impossible.  
Compounding the issue, the American sanctions regime is shrouded in a lack 
of transparency, with little allowance to appeal decisions made by the 
executive branch.  This Note examines the various methods by which an 
adversely affected party can challenge U.S. secondary sanctions.  Finding 
these available methods lacking in effectiveness, this Note argues that 
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several avenues for reform should be taken to mitigate a potential freezing 
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In 2017, the French energy giant, Total, signed an agreement to form a 
partnership with an Iranian company, Petropars, and invest one billion dollars 
in the development of oil and gas facilities in Iran.1  The companies made 
this investment agreement despite concerns that the Donald Trump 
administration would reimpose sanctions on Iran and companies doing 
business with Iran.2  A year later, Total announced its decision to withdraw 
from the same deal following the reimposition of American sanctions on 
Iran.3  The sanctions not only targeted Iran and Iranian companies but also 
covered any individuals or entities doing business with these primary 
targets.4  As such, Total withdrew from its agreement with Petropars due to 
the fear that it would be sanctioned and excluded from the U.S. market.5  
President Donald Trump articulated this threat in a sweeping tweet:  “Anyone 
doing business with Iran will NOT be doing business with the United 
States.”6  Total is one of many European companies withdrawing previous 
investments and halting operations in Iran due to the threat of U.S. secondary 
sanctions.7 
This trend of multinational businesses halting investment in Iran 
continues, despite the European Union’s (EU) attempts to hold together the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran 
nuclear deal.8  The EU has, for example, imposed blocking regulations 
prohibiting European companies from changing their courses of action solely 
in order to comply with U.S. sanctions.9  The conflict between these two legal 
regimes on either side of the Atlantic leaves affected individuals and entities 
in a difficult position.10 
 
 1. See Stanley Reed, Total Signs Deal with Iran, Exposing It to Big Risks and Rewards, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/business/energy-
environment/iran-total-france-gas-energy.html [https://perma.cc/U2SW-AMMJ]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Michael Selby-Green, French Oil Giant Total Pulls Out of $4.8 Billion Iran Deal 
Under US Pressure, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2018, 6:23 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/total-pulls-out-of-48-billion-iranian-oil-project-under-us-
pressure-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/R3LU-T7GW]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:31 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1026762818773757955 [https://perma.cc/5DH7-
WZ6E]. 
 7. See Selby-Green, supra note 3. 
 8. See Casper Wuite, European Companies Driven Out of Iran, INTERPRETER (Oct. 19, 
2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/european-companies-driven-
out-iran [https://perma.cc/C6ZU-ZT8Z]. 
 9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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The United States has long utilized economic sanctions to achieve foreign 
policy objectives without the use of military force.11  However, there has 
been a notable increase in the use of sanctions over the last several 
presidential administrations, particularly secondary sanctions.12  The 
challenge presented by the increasing use of these sanctions and their 
apparent conflict with European law is compounded by the lack of clarity 
surrounding the U.S. sanctions regime and the limited ability of targeted 
parties to challenge sanctions once issued.13  Under current law, a party 
adversely affected by secondary sanctions faces hefty fines14 and has little 
recourse to challenge them.15 
This Note examines the limited extent to which parties adversely affected 
by the application of secondary sanctions may dispute them and suggests 
reforms to the sanctions system.  Part I provides relevant background 
regarding the historically broad U.S. sanctions regime and the increasingly 
conflicting international response.  Part I explores this conflict and the 
resulting war of sanctions, in which multinational corporations face difficult 
decisions.  Part I also outlines the legal authority behind the U.S. sanctions 
regime, which is integral to understanding how the regime may be 
challenged.  Part II outlines the current state of the law regarding the U.S. 
sanctions regime and the tradition of judicial deference to the executive 
branch in international affairs, including its use of economic sanctions.  Part 
III recommends increasing the transparency of the U.S. secondary sanctions 
regime through legislative action, allowing for heightened judicial review, in 
order to mitigate secondary sanctions’ adverse effects on international 
commerce. 
I.  U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD  
Part I provides background regarding the use of international economic 
sanctions.  Part I.A discusses the history and purpose of U.S. sanctions, 
including secondary sanctions.  Part I.B outlines the relevant statutory and 
administrative authority behind the U.S. sanctions regime and analyzes the 
practical effects of these authorities through a case study.  Part I.C examines 
Europe’s historical responses to the U.S. sanctions regime and the increasing 
popularity of retaliatory sanctions within Europe. 
 
 11. See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions:  Improving the Haphazard 
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (1987) (discussing the historical use of 
economic sanctions by the United States and the dominance of sanctions as a tool in American 
foreign policy). 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. SAMANTHA SULTOON & JUSTINE WALKER, ATL. COUNCIL, SECONDARY SANCTIONS’ 
IMPLICATIONS AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP (2019), https://www. 
atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SecondarySanctions_Final.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5J8S-FVLH]. 
 14. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.  The Development of the U.S. Sanctions Regime 
Part I.A.1 introduces how the use of sanctions has generally been 
prioritized over the use of military force in American foreign policy.  Part 
I.A.2 specifically addresses the use of secondary sanctions and the mechanics 
of their implementation. 
1.  Use in Diplomacy 
The United States has historically maintained a broad sanctions regime.16  
As early as the War of 1812, then secretary of the treasury, Albert Gallatin 
administered sanctions against Great Britain for the harassment of American 
sailors.17  In the throes of the Civil War, Congress enacted a law prohibiting 
transactions with the Confederate States of America, providing for the 
forfeiture of goods involved in any such transactions and structuring an 
exemption licensing regime under rules administered by the Department of 
the Treasury.18 
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States began implementing 
economic sanctions as a means of exerting diplomatic influence on the 
international stage.19  American policymakers’ frequent use of economic 
sanctions reflects a calculated choice to select sanctions from among a wide 
variety of tools available to them.  Part of this choice is a recognition that a 
generally accepted norm within the post–World War international 
community is avoiding the use of armed force in foreign affairs.20  This 
normative limitation, coupled with the large investment of economic and 
human resources necessary for use of force, makes economic sanctions a 
more palatable alternative means to exert international influence.  Economic 
sanctions allow the administering country’s leader to appear both decisive 
and effective in decision-making, while avoiding the death toll and 
destruction inherent in the use of force.21  Economic sanctions are thus more 
normatively acceptable than use of armed force, yet more material than 
diplomatic protests and entreaties. 
The United States has often resorted to implementing unilateral sanctions 
to achieve foreign policy objectives that lack international consensus.22  For 
example, the unilateral decision of the United States to withdraw from the 
JCPOA angered many European allies who saw the accompanying increase 
in economic sanctions on Iran as counterproductive.23  The Trump 
 
 16. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1170. 
 17. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1501 
[https://perma.cc/5BQ5-YA4D] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1164. 
 20. See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER:  THE LEGALIST APPROACH 
TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 21 (1999). 
 21. See Carter, supra note 11, at 1163. 
 22. Gary Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 332, 335 (1998). 
 23. Ian Talley et al., New U.S. Sanctions on Iran Set Back French Mediation Efforts, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sanctions-iranian-oil-
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administration has overseen the most aggressive expansion of economic 
sanctions in modern U.S. history.24  The increased use of economic sanctions 
corresponded with the administration’s policy goals of strong-arming both 
North Korea and Iran into abandoning nuclear programs, compelling 
Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro to cede power, and responding to allegations of 
Russian interference in American elections.25  The Trump administration’s 
increased use of economic sanctions is consistent with the overall trend of 
increasing sanction use in recent American history.26 
2.  Secondary Sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
Economic sanctions have been defined as “the deliberate, government-
inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial 
relations.”27  Sanctions typically include a wide swath of economic measures, 
including:  trade embargoes; restrictions on exports from or imports to the 
American market; cessation of aid to foreign countries, loans, and foreign 
direct investment; and control (i.e., freezing) of foreign assets and economic 
transactions that involve American citizens or businesses.28  It would be an 
oversimplification to analyze the sanctions regime en masse, as it can be 
bifurcated into primary and secondary sanctions. 
Primary sanctions prohibit companies and individuals in the sanctioning 
country from engaging with their counterparts in the sanctioned country.29  
These primary sanctions apply to persons, transactions, and goods over 
which the sanctioning country can assert its jurisdiction.  For example, in the 
case of the United States, primary sanctions apply to American nationals, 
American business entities, and any transactions occurring within U.S. 
territory. 
More controversially, the United States also employs secondary 
sanctions.30  A secondary sanction is  
any form of economic restriction imposed by a sanctioning or sending state 




 24. Ian Talley, Top U.S. Sanctions Chief to Leave Trump Administration for Private 
Sector, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-u-s-sanctions-
chief-to-leave-trump-administration-for-private-sector-11570025888 [https://perma.cc/ 
D8AL-KP5C]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. ELLIE GERANMAYEH & MANUEL L. RAPNOUIL, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS (2019), https://ecfr.eu/wp-
content/uploads/4_Meeting_the_challenge_of_secondary_sanctions.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3W28-9DCH]. 
 27. 1 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:  HISTORY 
AND CURRENT POLICY 2 (2d ed. 1990). 
 28. DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-949F, ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1, 2 (1998). 
 29. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 
926 (2009) 
 30. See SULTOON & WALKER, supra note 13. 
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citizens and companies (e.g., France, the French people and French 
companies) from transacting with a sanctions target (e.g., a rogue regime, 
its high government officials, or a non-state terrorist entity).31 
The need for secondary sanctions presupposes that the home country of these 
third parties is neutral with regard to the target of the primary sanctions.32 
The controversial characteristic of these secondary sanctions is their 
extraterritoriality—they apply to foreign persons or entities over which the 
U.S. Treasury Department traditionally would not have jurisdiction.33  Thus, 
secondary sanctions differ from primary sanctions in that they are not 
directed at the primary target but rather directed at the neutral third party.  
“The imposition of secondary sanctions presupposes that the affected third-
party country is a neutral or an ally of the target state—that the third-party 
country has not itself instituted comparable sanctions to prohibit its own 
citizens and companies from doing business with the target regime.”34 
These secondary sanctions threaten to cut off foreign persons or entities 
from accessing the U.S. consumer and financial markets if they trade or 
otherwise transact with an entity or state subject to primary sanctions.35  The 
use of these secondary sanctions is premised on the long-standing belief 
among American policymakers that, because the United States is one of the 
central figures of the global economy, any threat of restricting access to the 
American consumer and finance markets amplifies sanctions’ effects beyond 
the territorial limits inherent to primary sanctions.36  Thus, secondary 
sanctions are able to achieve extraterritorial effect without necessarily 
requiring the aggressive overuse of primary sanctions. 
Since the Korean War, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has 
headed the U.S. sanctions regime from within the Department of the 
Treasury.37  OFAC’s primary mandate is to administer and enforce the 
entirety of the broad U.S. sanctions regime.38  As an administrative agency, 
OFAC exercises its mandate pursuant to various statutory delegations, most 
importantly, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act39 (IEEPA). 
However, as an agency within the Treasury Department under the executive 
branch, OFAC has traditionally been afforded wide discretion by Congress 
 
 31. Meyer, supra note 29, at 926 (2009). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 34. Meyer, supra note 29, at 926. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Rachel Barnes, United States Sanctions: Delisting Applications, Judicial Review 
and Secret Evidence, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 197–98 
(Matthew Happold & Paul Eden eds., 2016).  
 37. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17. 
 38. Jill M. Troxel, Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations:  Making Attorneys 
Choose Between Compliance and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 24 REV. LITIG. 637, 639 
(2005). 
 39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708. 
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and the courts, which recognize that international affairs are firmly within 
the province of the executive.40 
While OFAC publicly holds itself out as primarily targeting sanctioned 
countries and terrorists,41 the agency also plays a key role in enforcing 
secondary sanctions that adversely impact allied and nonenemy entities 
outside of U.S. jurisdiction.  Under the auspices of enforcing secondary 
sanctions, OFAC effectively employs a range of other measures to influence 
actions by non-U.S. nationals in non-U.S. territory.42  These measures range 
from inclusion on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 
list (“the SDN List”), resulting in a freezing of assets and restriction of 
physical and monetary movement, to prohibitions on obtaining financing 
provided by U.S. financial institutions.43 
There is a very real fear among European commentators that, as secondary 
sanctions continue to operate effectively under a cloudy legal framework, the 
United States will further expand their use.44  OFAC is able to target an 
increasing number of European corporations by restricting European free 
choice in access to global markets.45  Essentially, secondary sanctions bring 
European companies and firms squarely under the authority of OFAC. 
In large part, secondary sanctions achieve this thanks to the critical role 
that the United States plays in global commerce.  American banks and the 
U.S. dollar are enjoying unprecedented dominance in global capital markets 
and financial transactions.46  Due to the international community’s 
dependence on American banks and the U.S. dollar, the threat of OFAC 
sanctioning—such as inclusion on the SDN List—has ripple effects, resulting 
in many international business entities overcomplying with existing 
sanctions regimes.47  This has resulted in capital flowing less freely across 
borders and a major reputational hit to the EU concerning its autonomy and 
 
 40. James C. McMillin, M. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and U.S. Trade, 14 FORDHAM 
INT’L L. J., 867, 867 (1990) (articulating the long-held belief that “[l]ike war, however, 
economic sanctions are the province of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. 
government:  the judiciary, playing the supportive role, declares executive acts either 
constitutionally permissible or statutorily authorized”). 
 41. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17. 
 42. See generally JOHN J. FORRER, ATL. COUNCIL, SECONDARY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:  
EFFECTIVE POLICY OR RISKY BUSINESS 3 (2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Secondary_Sanctions_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TWV-
73NZ]. 
 43. See Matthew Townsend et al., Iran Sanctions and the EU Blocking Regulation:  
Navigating Legal Conflict, LEGAL & REGUL. RISK NOTE, Oct. 2018, at 6, 7, 
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/legal-and-regulatory-risks-for-
the-finance-sector [https://perma.cc/BVB6-5MJY]. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Liz Hoffman & Telis Demos, How US Banks Took Over the World, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 4, 2019, 5:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-u-s-banks-took-over-the-world-
11567589403 [https://perma.cc/N9EB-AR73]. 
 47. See Townsend et al., supra note 43. 
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international influence.48  European business entities are complying with 
American foreign policy over the policies of their own nations.49 
B.  The Legal Authority Behind U.S. Sanctions 
An amalgamation of legal authorities makes the broad U.S. sanctions 
regime, maintained and enforced by OFAC, possible.  Part I.B.1 presents the 
National Emergencies Act50 (NEA) and Part I.B.2 discusses IEEPA.  Part 
I.B.3 analyzes the importance of executive orders to OFAC’s authority.  
Finally, Part I.B.4 examines how the above three authorities mix in practice 
and result in a particular OFAC sanctions program. 
1.  The NEA 
The NEA was enacted a year before IEEPA, in an effort by Congress to 
curtail many of the foreign relations powers it believed had been usurped by 
the executive.51  The NEA terminated all ongoing so-called “emergencies” 
in 1978—except those making use of section 5(b) of the Trading with the 
Enemy Act52 (TWEA)53—and placed new curtailments on how the executive 
could declare an emergency in the future and the duration of such a declared 
state of emergency (e.g., the requirement that the president immediately 
notify Congress of the national emergency declaration).54  Further, in 
enacting the NEA, Congress required a biannual review whereby “each 
House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent [joint] 
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”55  The 
NEA also authorized Congress to terminate the executive’s declared national 
emergency through a concurrent resolution.56 
The NEA has been criticized for its lack of teeth.57  For example, while 
the NEA was intended to provide for congressional review of national 
emergencies declared by the president (and the associated powers granted to 
 
 48. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 10, 16, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 51. See generally S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT’L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY 
POWERS, 93RD CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Comm. Print 1974) (including a study by Harold C. Relyea). 
 52. Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4305(b)) 
 53. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 54. See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT:  ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 10–11 (2020). 
 55. 50 U.S.C. § 1601. 
 56. See id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that legislative 
vetoes of the executive are unconstitutional).  In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding 
in Chadha, Congress amended the NEA on August 16, 1985, changing the requirement of a 
“concurrent” resolution to one of “joint” resolution in an effort to make the so-called 
“legislative veto” more democratically fortified. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, 99 Stat. 405, 448 (1985) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 57. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 9. 
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the president during emergencies) and allow for efficient termination of such 
an “emergency,” those intentions were quickly nullified by a U.S. Supreme 
Court case that found such a provision unconstitutional.58  Subsequent 
amendments by Congress requiring a joint resolution of both chambers to 
terminate a national emergency declared by the president made effective 
congressional review more difficult to achieve. 
2.  IEEPA 
Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977.59  IEEPA confers broad authority on the 
president to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a 
declaration of a national emergency.60  IEEPA is the foundation of the 
modern American sanctions regime.  IEEPA, like its progenitor, the TWEA, 
represents a delegation of emergency power to the executive branch.61  Like 
the TWEA, presidents have used IEEPA to:  restrict a variety of international 
transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict 
exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct 
investment in American companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the 
United States.62  The targets of these regulations and restrictions, the 
frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have broadened in scope 
over the decades since enactment.63  Indeed, some scholars have argued—
with nodding approval from many members of Congress—that IEEPA is still 
a source of unchecked and broad discretionary power for the president.64 
The original ambit of the TWEA was exclusive to wartime, but it has 
become normal for presidents to apply it long after a war concludes.65  In 
fact, IEEPA was enacted out of an effort to curtail the seemingly limitless 
use of the TWEA by the president to exert control over international financial 
and trading transactions—even during peacetime.66  Specifically, section 
5(b) of the TWEA received much of the criticism because successive 
presidents interpreted it to confer on them unlimited international economic 
control powers, with full knowledge that once integrated into the American 
financial system during wartime, these economic regulations proved very 
 
 58. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923. 
 59. 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 
 60. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 42 (discussing the expansive authority granted to 
the president). 
 61. 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1). 
 62. Id. § 1702. 
 63. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 18–19 (observing that as of July 1, 2020, 
presidents had declared fifty-nine national emergencies invoking IEEPA, thirty-seven of 
which are still ongoing and that the United States had been in a “state of emergency” for more 
than forty years). 
 64. See, e.g., Patrick Thronson, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s Emergency 
Law Regime, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 737 (2013); Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Counterterrorism, 
the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide:  Evaluating the Designation of U.S. Persons 
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 95, 96–97 
(2011). 
 65. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 6–9. 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 9 (1977). 
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difficult to extricate postwar.67  A review of the legislative history behind 
IEEPA reveals that Congress was concerned that executive power in both 
domestic and international economic affairs had become too discretionary 
without any congressional review.68  For example, Professor Harold Maier 
testified before the House Committee on International Relations as to the 
TWEA:   
Section 5(b)’s effect is no longer confined to “emergency situations” in 
the sense of existing imminent danger.  The continuing retroactive 
approval, either explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive 
interpretations of the scope of powers which it confers has converted the 
section into a general grant of legislative authority to the President . . . .69 
Acting on these concerns, Congress enacted IEEPA to curtail the 
executive’s authority under the TWEA.  Among other measures, IEEPA 
conferred “upon the President a new set of authorities for use in time of 
national emergency which are both more limited in scope than those of 
section 5(b) and subject to various procedural limitations, including those of 
the National Emergencies Act.”70  Specifically, the House of Representatives 
aimed to limit the scope of section 5(b) by redefining “emergency” so as to 
disallow presidents to issue a state of emergency to last decades.71  The 
measures included within IEEPA intended to curtail the president’s authority 
in this area include notice requirements to Congress, along with reassessment 
and reports to Congress according to a regular, consistent time line.72 
Ultimately, IEEPA, along with its umbrella statute, the NEA, has proven 
ineffective at curtailing presidential invocation of emergency economic 
 
 67. See Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411, 415 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4305(b)). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 7. 
 69. Id. at 9 (quoting Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions:  
Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y & Trade of 
the H. Comm. on Int’l Rels., 95th Cong. 30 (1977) (statement of Harold G. Maier, Professor, 
Vanderbilt University School of Law)). 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 6–9.  The House Committee on International 
Relations provided its interpretation of an emergency in its “new approach” to the president’s 
international emergency economic powers: 
[G]iven the breadth of the authorities and their availability at the President’s 
discretion upon a declaration of a national emergency, their exercise should be 
subject to various substantive restrictions.  The main one stems from a recognition 
that emergencies are by their nature rare and brief, and are not to be equated with 
normal, ongoing problems.  A national emergency should be declared and 
emergency authorities employed only with respect to a specific set of circumstances 
which constitute a real emergency, and for no other purpose.  The emergency should 
be terminated in a timely manner when the factual state of emergency is over and 
not continued in effect for use in other circumstances.  A state of national emergency 
should not be a normal state of affairs. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 11. 
 72. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 10.  When declaring a national emergency, the 
NEA requires that the president “immediately” transmit a proclamation declaring the 
emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.  The president must also specify 
the provisions of law that the president intends to use. 50 U.S.C. § 1631. 
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powers.  Since congressional debate and the subsequent enactment of IEEPA, 
presidents regularly declare national emergencies with regard to international 
economic sanctions and renew them for years or even decades.73  Limiting 
IEEPA to transactions involving some foreign interest was intended to limit 
IEEPA’s domestic application.  However, globalization has eroded that 
distinction, as most transactions today involve some type of foreign 
interest.74  Many of the TWEA’s other shortcomings that IEEPA was 
supposed to address—consultation, time limits, congressional review, scope 
of power, and logical relationship to the emergency declared—are 
shortcomings of IEEPA that scholars still criticize today.75 
3.  Ukraine/Russia Case Study 
OFAC is an agency within the Department of the Treasury.76  As an 
executive branch agency, OFAC manages the broad U.S. sanctions regime 
largely at the behest of the president.77  Due to the large economic and social 
impact that sanctions can have on the American public, however, the modern 
American sanctions regime has its genesis in congressional action.78  This 
mix of statutory delegation and executive mandate results in a unique blend 
of authority for OFAC. 
The Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions program the Barack Obama 
administration implemented in 2014 is an example of the amalgamated 
authority under which OFAC administers sanctions programs.  OFAC took 
initial steps toward building such a sanctions regime at the behest of the 
president.79  On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive 
Order 13,660 (“EO 13,660”), which declared a national emergency to deal 
with the threat posed by persons or organizations undermining the 
democratic processes and institutions in the Ukraine.80  President Obama 
subsequently issued three more executive orders broadening the scope of the 
emergency previously declared in EO 13,660.81  These subsequent executive 
 
 73. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 42. 
 74. See generally IMF, Globalization:  A Brief Overview, Issues Brief (May 2008), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/pdf/053008.pdf [https://perma.cc/43GF-CCGT] 
(reporting that the value of trade (goods and services) as a percentage of world gross domestic 
product increased from 42.1 percent in 1980 to 62.1 percent in 2007). 
 75. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1392 (1989); Jason Luong, Forcing Constraint:  The Case for Amending the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2000). 
 76. See Off. of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 17. 
 77. See DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30384, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:  
LEGISLATION IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 2 (2000). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, DEP’T OF TREASURY, UKRAINE/RUSSIA-
RELATED SANCTIONS PROGRAM 3 (2016) (explaining the legally binding provisions, found in 
Executive Orders 13,660, 13,661, 13,662, 13,685, applicable laws, and implementing 
regulations in 31 C.F.R. pt. 589, governing the sanctions program, intended to be punitive to 
Russia due to its involvement in the Ukraine). 
 80. See Exec. Order No. 13,660, 3 C.F.R. 226 (2015). 
 81. See Exec. Order No. 13,661, 3 C.F.R. 229 (2015); Exec. Order No. 13,662, 3 C.F.R. 
233 (2015); Exec. Order No. 13,685, 3 C.F.R. 313 (2015). 
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orders were responses to the worsening situation in the Ukraine, linked to the 
actions and policies of the Russian Federation, including the allegedly illegal 
annexation of the Crimea region.82 
These executive orders authorized OFAC to impose sanctions against 
persons believed to have been involved in any illegal activities with respect 
to the Ukraine and its government, against persons involved with the Russian 
Federation in official capacities, and against industries and businesses 
operating in the Crimea region of the Ukraine.  Specifically, Executive Order 
13,685 (“EO 13,685”) placed a prohibition on the importing and exporting 
of goods and services to or from the Crimea region, while also forbidding 
new investment by any U.S. person or entity in the Crimea region.83  Each of 
these executive orders was issued pursuant to the authority statutorily given 
to the president by IEEPA and the NEA. 
Essentially, this series of executive orders outlined the policy directives 
OFAC was meant to achieve.  In achieving these directives, OFAC issued a 
set of regulations intended to implement the policy directives outlined in the 
executive orders.84  Accompanying these regulations, the secretary of the 
treasury issued determinations, akin to guidance documents, as to the scope 
of the executive orders and their corresponding sanctions, administered by 
OFAC.85 
In the specific case of the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions, OFAC 
structured a comprehensive sanctions program.  The program prohibited 
transactions in three broad categories.86  First, the so-called “blocking 
sanctions” prohibited any transactions by U.S. persons or transactions in the 
United States if they involved transferring, exporting, withdrawing, or 
otherwise dealing in property or interests in property of an entity or 
individual listed on the OFAC’s SDN List.87  Second, OFAC implemented 
sectoral sanctions, which prohibited extensions of debt or financing for 
entities operating in certain sectors of the Russian economy identified by the 
secretary of the treasury.88  Third, any future investment in, trade with, or 
provision of financing to entities by OFAC was prohibited.89 
 
 82. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79. 
 83. Exec. Order No. 13,685, 3 C.F.R. 313.  The president issued this executive order 
pursuant to IEEPA and the NEA to further economically constrict both the Crimea region and 
its Russian Federation associates as a means of showing disapproval of the allegedly illegal 
annexation of the region by the Russian Federation. 
 84. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 589 (2020). 
 85. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79 (explaining that “the Secretary 
of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination that 
section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 13662 shall apply to the financial services and energy sectors of the 
Russian Federation economy”).  Through these determinations, OFAC is able to expand the 
scope of a sanctions regime without the formal rulemaking or the informal notice-and-
comment rulemaking processes outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”:  General Policy Statements and Notice-and-
Comment Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491 (2016). 
 86. See OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, supra note 79, at 4–5. 
 87. See id. at 5. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 3. 
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Through this program, and specifically the future investment provision, 
OFAC effectively ensured that there would be limited, if any, future U.S. 
investment or trade within the Crimea region and with specifically designated 
Russian nationals (both corporations and natural persons).  For example, if a 
European company with extensive sales in the American market had been in 
negotiations with a Crimea-based counterpart, this sanctions regime was 
intended to stop those negotiations or threaten exclusion from the American 
market.90 
C.   History of Europe’s Response 
1.  Genesis of EU Blocking Regulations 
While the United States has historically maintained the broadest and most 
comprehensive sanctions regime, the EU and its member states have often 
implemented their own sanctions programs in coordination with those of the 
United States.  At times, however, the EU has been faced with U.S. sanctions 
that do not match EU foreign policy or even those that go so far as to target 
EU businesses and individuals. 
In the 1990s, Congress imposed a series of secondary sanctions on Cuba, 
Libya, and Iran with characteristically extraterritorial impact.91  Many of 
those impacted were European companies.92  For example, Europe 
understood the sanctions enacted against Cuba as 
contain[ing] a number of provisions which have the intent and effect to 
restrain the liberty of the [European Community] to export to Cuba or to 
trade in Cuban origin goods, as well as to restrict the freedom of [European 
Community] registered vessels and their cargo to transit through US 
ports.93 
In response, European governments lodged a complaint with the World 
Trade Organization94 (WTO) and conducted comprehensive, multilateral 
negotiations with the Bill Clinton administration to dissuade the United 
States from heavy-handed secondary sanctioning of European businesses.95 
The EU further responded with its own sanction-like apparatus:  blocking 
regulations.  Originally introduced by the EU in 1996, the blocking 
regulations prohibited European companies from complying with U.S. 
secondary sanctions.96  Through the blocking regulations, coupled with 
 
 90. See id. 
 91. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States—The Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS38/1 (May 13, 1996). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 96. See Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2 (defining blocking regulations). 
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WTO action and multilateral negotiations, the EU was able to avoid any 
adverse effects from the secondary sanctions.97 
2.  Changing of the Winds 
The above section illustrated an example of the EU asserting its own 
international influence in confronting secondary sanctions.  However, that 
proactive response was lacking at critical times during the development of 
the U.S. sanctions regime. 
a.  Falling into Line with America 
During the Obama administration, the United States took unprecedented 
steps toward strengthening its secondary sanctions through its response to the 
global financial crisis.  The administration increased oversight and regulation 
of global financial institutions who were willed to comply through the 
importance of the American market.98  According to one senior banking 
executive based in Europe:  “When the United States began using its 
secondary sanctions, it didn’t know if it would work.  There was trial and 
error involved.  If, at that time, all of the European central banks resisted 
these measures, it is uncertain if the U.S. could target them.”99  The United 
States would “target” these companies by either politically challenging these 
business entities100 or utilizing OFAC’s authority to include them on its SDN 
List.  Unfortunately for the EU, the various European central banks did not 
respond aggressively, and the United States’s reliance on secondary 
sanctions has only increased.101 
While the United States found its footing regarding its utilization of 
secondary sanctions on multinational companies, European countries backed 
U.S. foreign policy against Iran.  From 2010 to 2012, the EU and the United 
States introduced severe sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.  The severity was, 
in large part, due to the multilateral nature of the sanctions102—prohibiting 
Iranian oil from accessing the wealthy, gas-guzzling consumer markets of 
 
 97. See James Bennet, To Clear Air with Europe, U.S. Waives Some Sanctions, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 19, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/19/world/to-clear-air-with-europe-
us-waives-some-sanctions.html [https://perma.cc/FU82-RWCW]. 
 98. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Fear of being targeted politically by the United States is a justified concern for 
multinational businesses.  Indeed, business entities’ operations can be significantly impacted 
by public challenges from politicians. See Philip Bump, Did Donald Trump Tank Boeing’s 
Stock Because He Was Mad About a News Article? WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/06/did-donald-trump-tank-
boeings-stock-because-he-was-mad-about-a-news-article [https://perma.cc/8JKB-4UPR].  
See generally Sam Thielman, Trump’s Tweet About Lockheed-Martin Cuts $4bn in Value as 
Share Prices Fall, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ 
dec/12/lockheed-martin-share-prices-donald-trump-tweet [https://perma.cc/BFU4-V9BV]. 
 101. See generally William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus 
Multilateral International Sanctions:  A Public Choice Perspective, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 37 
(1999) (examining and arguing for the increased use of unilateral sanctions). 
 102. See id. at 53–54. 
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both Europe and the United States packed a powerful punch against Iran.103  
There was no conflict at the time over these sanctions on Iran because the 
respective foreign policies on either side of the Atlantic aligned.104  For 
example, in 2012, Congress introduced legislation to disconnect Iranian 
banks from the Belgium-based SWIFT—the financial messaging company 
that was used near universally for global payments.105  Seeking to present a 
united front with the United States, the EU passed a similar regulation shortly 
thereafter.106 
It was significant that the EU joined the Obama administration in applying 
strong sanctions, including cutting off Iran from SWIFT, as it showed 
solidarity in coercing Iran into negotiations foreshadowing the landmark 
nuclear deal (the JCPOA).  However, Europe also set a dangerous precedent 
for the United States by allowing American secondary sanctions to cut off 
business from a European business entity directly.107  American lawmakers 
have followed this precedent by further sanctioning Iranian financial 
institutions—with the potential that the United States would follow the same 
path in targeting Venezuela or Russia in the future.108  Despite protestation 
from some of its member states (e.g., Belgium), the EU fell into line with 
U.S. policy—essentially ratifying American use of secondary sanctions 
against a European banking system that has never before ousted a nation from 
its network.109 
b.  European Overcompliance 
Part of the effectiveness of U.S. secondary sanctions stems from the highly 
discretionary power of OFAC, which through its legislative delegation and 
executive mandates, can dedicate vast resources to sanctions designations, 
implementation, and enforcement.110  According to one former senior U.S. 
Treasury official, U.S. district and appeals court rulings imply that the 
executive branch has significant discretion in this area.111  No Supreme Court 
case has directly addressed the scope of OFAC’s authority, though it is likely 
 
 103. Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions 
[https://perma.cc/52U4-59TN] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 104. See Rick Gladstone & Nicholas Kulish, West Tightens Iran Sanctions After Embassy 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/world/middleeast/ 
britain-closure-embassy-iran-expel-diplomats.html [https://perma.cc/H8BD-3P87]. 
 105. See Philip Blenkinsop & Rachelle Younglai, Banking’s SWIFT Says Ready to Block 
Iran Transactions, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
sanctions-swift/bankings-swift-says-ready-to-block-iran-transactions-
idUSTRE81G26820120217 [https://perma.cc/LCL8-7WMU]. 
 106. Id. (“The United States has been pushing the European Union to force SWIFT to evict 
the Iranian firms but it was unclear whether the EU would reach an agreement . . . SWIFT’s 
home country, Belgium, does not think the global banking firm should be the only company 
of its kind required to comply with sanctions.”). 
 107. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Blenkinsop & Younglai, supra note 105. 
 110. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 111. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26. 
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that the highest court would rule consistently with district courts, which have 
tended to show deference to the executive in matters of international 
affairs.112 
The uncertainty surrounding the operation and procedure behind the 
designation, implementation, and enforcement of secondary sanctions has 
disproportionately amplified their impact.  Such a lack of transparency and 
the difficulty of interpreting OFAC’s measures and enforcement have led to 
high levels of overcompliance by Europe-based business entities, which find 
it preferable to abandon business ties and investments in Iran rather than risk 
inadvertently violating any sanctions.113  OFAC’s response to continued 
requests from European governments for clarity on these issues has been 
slow, inadequate, and, some argue, deliberately oppositional.114 
3.  Reprisal of the Blocking Regulations 
In the wake of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA on 
May 8, 2018, the EU has once again faced secondary sanctions affecting 
European individuals and business entities.115  The EU has responded with a 
reprisal of the EU blocking regulations of the 1990s, which prohibit 
European business entities from altering their business operations for the sole 
reason of complying with U.S. sanctions.116 
Indeed, the revamped and updated EU blocking regulations prohibit any 
EU person or entity from complying with secondary sanctions reimposed 
after the United States abandoned the JCPOA.117  Although the regulations 
provide for a licensing derogation, qualifying for a license requires the 
applying party to demonstrate that “serious damage” would result from 
noncompliance with the subject U.S. sanction, harming either the party or the 
EU.118  Such licensing has proven elusive because licenses are rarely ever 
 
 112. See Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 
805, 805–06 (1989); see also infra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. 
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 114. See GERANMAYEH & RAPNOUIL, supra note 26 (“As demonstrated by the Trump 
administration’s approach to waivers for continued purchase of Iranian oil, the limited and 
temporary exemptions the US may issue to European companies only add to the measures’ 
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underscores the lack of European understanding of OFAC’s procedures). 
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Sanctions over Iran, REUTERS (May 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
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idUSKBN1IA2PV [https://perma.cc/T6DT-DQ7G]. 
 117. Council Regulation 2271/96, art. 5, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1, 4 (EC). 
 118. Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/1100 of June 6, 2018, 2018 O.J. (L 199) 1 
(EU). 
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granted.119  On the other hand, the blocking regulations do provide 
protections to EU persons and entities—assuring that any U.S. court 
judgment or administrative (i.e., OFAC) determination against an EU person 
or entity enforcing targeted U.S. secondary sanctions will not be enforced or 
given effect in an EU court.120  Further, the blocking regulations provide the 
statutory right for any EU person or entity adversely impacted as a result of 
another person or entity complying with the targeted U.S. sanctions to 
recover damages from that person or entity.121 
This break from the European norm of weak responses to U.S. sanctions 
is likely a result of the EU attempting not to lose its diplomatic gravitas, 
especially regarding the JCPOA.122  Significantly, however, this strong 
response has placed U.S. secondary sanctions and EU blocking regulations 
on a crash course, as compliance with both regimes is impossible. 
4.  Winter Is Coming 
The consequence of U.S. secondary sanctions and their outsized influence 
is a chilling of the flow of capital, goods, and services.123  These 
consequences are only amplified when the U.S. secondary sanctions are 
directly at odds with EU blocking regulations.124  The following sections 
examine the potential impact of broad secondary sanctions and their conflict 
with EU blocking regulations. 
a.  Impact on Global Commerce 
The direct consequence of the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran 
(particularly the secondary sanctions) and the EU’s subsequent updating of 
the blocking regulations is that both legal regimes are now squarely in 
conflict with each other.  This situation may be termed a “sanctions war.”  
This conflict of laws largely results from posturing by both sides, as the 
United States is increasingly relying on secondary sanctions to exert an 
outsized influence on the global economy, and the EU is responding in an 
attempt to maintain some of its autonomy and diplomatic gravitas.125  
Whatever the political reasoning, these conflicting regimes have, of course, 
been registered by multinational business entities who may be targeted by the 
EU or the United States, acting through OFAC.126 
 
 119. See Townsend et al., supra note 43, at 2. 
 120. Commission Delegated Regulation 2018/1100, supra note 118, at 1. 
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These business entities are left with two options.127  First, they may choose 
noncompliance with U.S. secondary sanctions, which can lead to punishment 
at the hands of OFAC.  Second, they may choose to comply with U.S. 
sanctions and face the resulting consequences of noncompliance with EU 
blocking regulations. 
This conflict of laws leaves these multinational entities in a precarious 
legal position.  Historically, the U.S. sanctions regime has set the standard of 
compliance.128  Many multinational business entities have complied with 
OFAC’s guidelines and sanctions programs as a matter of course because the 
U.S. sanctions regime was often consistent with those of European nations 
and access to U.S. markets is of paramount importance.129  Legal advisors 
report that there is no obvious solution to this conflict of laws.130  
Multinational companies now show a reluctance to engage in deals and 
financing where a conflict of sanctions opens potential liability under one 
regime or the other.131 
As the United States increasingly pursues secondary sanctions, both 
unilateral in nature and fraught with ever-increasing fines,132 multinational 
businesses face a false choice between halting operations or noncompliance 
with one regime of sanctions. 
b.  Case Study of Executive Order 13,846 
On August 6, 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,846 (“EO 
13,846”) announcing the reimposition of certain sanctions in relation to 
Iran.133  This followed the president’s declaration on May 8, 2018, in which 
he announced that the United States would withdraw from the JCPOA.134  
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1018 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
EO 13,846 provided for three specific types of secondary sanctions that 
OFAC was to reimplement with regard to Iran.136  First, the order provides 
for blocking sanctions, such as those imposed against entities or persons 
placed on the SDN List, allowing OFAC to freeze the assets of these entities 
or persons.137  Second, the order provides for correspondent and payable-
through account sanctions, which prohibit or restrict U.S. banks from 
opening or maintaining U.S.-based accounts for any foreign business entities 
designated by OFAC.138  This amounts to cutting these foreign business 
entities or financial institutions off from the American financial system (and 
in some cases, ostracizing them from U.S. dollar-based trade, in general).139  
Finally, the order provides for a la carte sanctions, authorizing OFAC to 
select from a variety of possible sanctions—including visa limitations and 
asset-blocking sanctions—to impose against designated entities.140  All three 
powers EO 13,846 endows upon OFAC are highly discretionary. 
The EU promptly responded with the General Blocking Regulation and 
the reimposed Iran Sanctions Blocking Regulation designed to prohibit 
compliance by EU entities with the newly reimposed United States 
sanctions.141  The “two actions appear to place multinational companies in 
an impossible bind between the inconsistent demands (and rhetoric) of 
powerful regulators.”142 
How OFAC and its European counterparts choose to enforce these 
conflicting sanctions regimes remains to be seen.  However, the actions have 
already had a chilling effect on international commerce.143 
II.  THE LEGAL CONFLICT:  RESPONDING TO SECONDARY SANCTIONS 
In light of this legal conflict between the U.S. and European sanctions 
regimes, this Note proposes several potential courses of action to mitigate the 
freezing effect on international business in a highly globalized world of 
commerce.  Part II.A examines the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, 
which may be available to a party targeted with secondary sanctions and 
explains its futility in the context of secondary sanctions.  Part II.B explains 
the limited case law challenging OFAC’s authority.  Part II.C presents a 
picture of judicial timidity in reviewing matters of international sanctions and 
discusses the genesis of this deference to OFAC. 
 
 136. See id. 
 137. Exec. Order No. 13,846, § 1, 83 Fed. Reg. at 38,939–40. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Council Regulation 2271/96, supra note 117, at 4–6. 
 142. The “New” Iran E.O., supra note 126. 
 143. See Babak Dehghanpisheh & Peter Graff, Trump Says Firms Doing Business in Iran 
to Be Barred from U.S. as Sanctions Hit, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/trump-says-firms-doing-business-in-iran-to-
be-barred-from-u-s-as-sanctions-hit-idUSKBN1KS13I [https://perma.cc/7C3P-7RNX] 
(reporting that French oil company Total and car manufacturers Renault, PSA, and Daimler 
had all suspended investment plans in consideration of the reimposed secondary sanctions). 
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A.  The Defense of Foreign Sovereign Compulsion 
Where the EU’s blocking regulations impose directly conflicting 
obligations on multinational entities facing liability from both European and 
American sanctions, these entities may “plead the defense of foreign 
sovereign compulsion to a foreign court in an effort not to comply with its 
extra-territorial laws.”144  Under U.S. case law the defense of foreign 
sovereign compulsion shields “the acts of parties carried out in obedience to 
the mandate of a foreign government” from civil liability.145  To prevail on 
a foreign sovereign compulsion defense, “a party must show that:  (1) the 
behavior violating American law was actually compelled by the foreign 
government; and (2) the foreign order was ‘basic and fundamental’ to the 
alleged behavior and not just peripheral to the illegal course of conduct.”146 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of foreign sovereign compulsion 
in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District 
Court,147 where a French blocking statute precluded French citizens from 
disclosing evidence to U.S. courts.  The Supreme Court held that the U.S. 
court was not precluded from ordering a foreign party over whom the court 
exercised personal jurisdiction to produce evidence, even if such an order 
would cause the foreign party to violate French law.148 
The Court reasoned that the French blocking statute was almost 
completely irrelevant to its decision affirming the order to produce evidence. 
It is clear that American courts are not required to adhere blindly to the 
directives of such a [foreign blocking] statute.  Indeed, the language of the 
statute, if taken literally, would appear to represent an extraordinary 
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the Republic of France over a United 
States district judge . . . .149 
This prospect of extraterritorial reach by a foreign legislature was deemed 
insupportable by the Court.150 
Similarly, in another Supreme Court case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California,151 British reinsurers asserted that the American courts lacked 
jurisdiction under principles of comity152 as a defense to charges of violating 
the Sherman Act.153  The British defendants claimed that applying the 
Sherman Act to their conduct would create a significant conflict with U.K. 
law.154  Essentially, they pleaded a defense of foreign sovereign compulsion.  
The Court refused to give this defense much weight, instead holding that 
 
 144. SAMUEL KERN ALEXANDER III, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 251 (1st ed. 2009). 
 145. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 146. United States v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting 
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293). 
 147. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 148. See id. at 544. 
 149. Id. at 544 n.29. 
 150. Id. at 544. 
 151. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 152. Id. at 799. 
 153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
 154. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 799. 
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there was no true conflict in the laws:  “Since the London reinsurers do not 
argue that British law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the 
law of the United States or claim that their compliance with the laws of both 
countries is otherwise impossible, we see no conflict with British law.”155  
The mere fact that the subject conduct is lawful in the foreign state will not, 
of itself, bar application of the U.S. laws.156 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in both Aérospatiale and Hartford Fire 
Insurance implies that it would address a foreign sovereign compulsion 
defense by a party targeted by secondary sanctions in much the same way.  
The Court would likely look to determine whether “there is in fact a true 
conflict between domestic and foreign law.”157  In other words, the Court 
would look to whether the foreign party’s inconvenience in having to choose 
between penalties for violating a foreign blocking statute or penalties for not 
complying with U.S. secondary sanctions rises to “a true conflict between 
domestic and foreign law.”158  Where U.S. fines administered by OFAC are 
increasingly harsh and an SDN listing can cut a company off from the 
American market altogether, a court may very well find this defense 
viable.159 
B.  Challenging OFAC 
The alternative to the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion would be 
an adversely affected party mounting a proactive challenge to an OFAC 
determination.160  There is limited case law covering challenges to OFAC 
determinations.  The jurisprudence addressing the authority of OFAC is 
largely limited to cases involving terrorist designation, a process in which 
OFAC lists an individual as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
(SDGT).161  However, whether an adversely affected party is designated on 
the SDN List (a common punishment for secondary sanction violations) or 
the SDGT list, the recourse available to that party is largely the same.  If a 
party is designated on either list and thus has its assets frozen, there are 
several means by which it may challenge such a designation.162  First, the 
agency’s rules allow for administrative reconsideration.163  Second, if the 
 
 155. Id. (citation omitted). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 403 cmt. e (AM. L. 
INST. 1987). Subsection 3 of the Restatement (Third), calling for states to reconsider their laws 
out of the principle of comity, “does not apply merely because one state has a strong policy to 
permit or encourage an activity which another state prohibits, or one state exempts from 
regulation an activity which another regulates.” Id.  Subsection 3 applies to exceptional 
circumstances. Id. 
 157. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. at 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 202. 
 161. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 162. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 202. 
 163. See id. at 204. 
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adversely affected party is afforded constitutional protections, it may claim 
constitutional violations in court.164  If a party does not qualify for 
constitutional protections, it may still be able to seek judicial review on other 
grounds.165  Either way, judicial review is limited. 
1.  Administrative Recourse 
The mechanisms by which parties can seek administrative reconsideration 
from OFAC are outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations.166  These 
codified rules issued by OFAC provide limited administrative recourse to 
listed parties.167  The recourse includes a mechanism for agency 
reconsideration of a party’s designation, in which the designated party may 
either submit evidence that shows an insufficient basis for the designation or 
propose remedial steps that would negate the designation.168 
Importantly, however, the rules promulgated by OFAC require no 
transparency regarding what factors were taken into account prior to the 
designation or which may be taken into account on administrative 
reconsideration.169  Therefore, any evidence submitted by the designated 
party is akin to a shot in the dark, hoping the evidence will satisfy OFAC’s 
specific concerns. 
The D.C. Court of Appeals has described the administrative 
reconsideration mechanisms provided by the OFAC regulations as “unlike 
the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding,” because “there is no 
adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as 
evidence, [and] no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s 
internal deliberations.”170  Further, there is no requirement for OFAC to 
provide proceedings akin to a trial or oral hearings.171  Under the limited 
procedural rights that the OFAC regulations provide, “listed persons are 
often in a position in which they are unable to refute rather than simply to 
deny the essential allegations made against them.”172 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See 31 C.F.R. § 501 (2020). 
 167. See id. §§ 501.806, 501.807(a).  The three grounds on which a request for 
administrative reconsideration by OFAC may be made are:  (1) where a party to blocked 
transactions claims that the funds in question have been blocked due to mistaken identity, (2) 
where a person believes that a sufficient basis for the designation does not exist, or (3) where 
a person proposes to take remedial measures that they believe would negate the basis for the 
designation. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 197. 
 168. See Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-
list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list [https://perma.cc/QDP4-ZPGM] 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
 169. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 204. 
 170. People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
 171. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
 172. Barnes, supra note 36, at 206. 
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Moreover, it is unclear whether an individual must exhaust the 
administrative appeal process before seeking judicial review.173  If a party is 
able to claim constitutional violations, however, any possible judicial review 
will be more substantive. 
2.  Violation of Due Process 
If a listed party is able to avail itself of constitutional protections, the party 
may claim that the procedural inadequacies of the OFAC regulations violate 
its right to due process.174  The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property 
without the due process of law.175  A court has held in a due process challenge 
that OFAC must provide notice of the nonclassified information 
underpinning the designation decision to a petitioner to whom the 
Constitution applies and must provide the designated party with an 
opportunity to present, in writing, evidence, or arguments to rebut the 
allegations made against them.176  However, these requirements are subject 
to limitations in special circumstances.  For example, the government may 
withhold unlimited evidence on which it has relied for designation purposes 
if the government determines the material is classified.177 
In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. United States Department of 
Treasury,178 plaintiff Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (“AHIF–Oregon”) 
was a nonprofit organization challenging OFAC’s determination to designate 
it an SDGT and the subsequent freezing of its assets (a process akin to SDN 
listing) due to allegations that the organization supported terrorists.179  One 
of the main claims AHIF–Oregon made on appeal was that its constitutional 
right to due process had been violated by OFAC’s confidential designation 
process.180  In Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiff’s due 
process claim under the Mathews v. Eldridge181 test, which is used for 
procedural due process claims.182  Under the Mathews balancing test, the 
court must weigh:  “(1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest, (2) 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
 
 173. James Killick et al., Challenging Sanctions Designations:  Politics and the Judiciary 
Collide, in WHITE & CASE LLP, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS:  READING THE SIGNALS 12, 15 
(2014), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/ 
whitecase_globalinvestigations_readingthesignals.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2CZ-7ESL]. 
 174. See Barnes, supra note 36, at 206–07. 
 175. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 176. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001). 
 177. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 982 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
 178. 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 179. See id. at 971. 
 180. Id. at 970. 
 181. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 182. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 979.  The Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 528–29 (2004), that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a 
person’s due process rights is the Mathews balancing test. Id. 
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used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3) the Government’s 
interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional 
procedural requirements.”183 
Pursuant to the Mathews test, the court recognized the substantial property 
interests of AHIF–Oregon, which OFAC’s actions threatened.184  Likewise, 
the court acknowledged the high risk of an erroneous deprivation where 
OFAC uses confidential information as a basis for an SDGT designation and 
asset freezing.185  The court had previously held, with respect to undisclosed 
confidential information, that “the very foundation of the adversary process 
assumes that use of undisclosed information will violate due process because 
of the risk of error.”186 
AHIF–Oregon relied on this precedent in its argument that OFAC’s use of 
confidential information in its designation was a per se violation of its right 
to due process.187  The court disagreed with this interpretation.188  Rather, 
the court found that using confidential information is only presumptively 
unconstitutional, with that presumption being rebuttable by the government 
in “the most extraordinary circumstances.”189  Ultimately, the court found 
that the national security interests, provided for in the third factor of the 
Mathews balancing test, outweighed the countervailing concerns of the 
plaintiff’s right to due process.190 
In Al Haramain, the Ninth Circuit found that the national security interests 
offered by OFAC were enough to outweigh the other Mathews factors.  
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the executive’s determination that 
AHIF–Oregon presented a national security risk. 
3.  The Nondelegation Doctrine 
An alternate argument that an adversely affected party can make is that 
OFAC is exercising authority invalidly delegated by Congress to the 
executive branch.191  However, case law suggests this argument would likely 
fail.192  “U.S. courts have not been receptive to arguments that this 
Congressional oversight function is an insufficient control on delegated 
executive power and that the [IEEPA] is an unconstitutional delegation of 
 
 183. Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Mathews, 424 U.S at 334–35). 
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legislative authority to the Executive.”193  Rather, courts find sufficient 
IEEPA’s envisaged congressional oversight of the executive through its 
reporting requirements.194 
C.  Limited Judicial Review 
If the adversely affected party is unsuccessful in its request for an 
administrative reconsideration of its case, the party may pursue judicial 
review of OFAC’s agency decision.195 
1.  A Silent IEEPA 
IEEPA does not explicitly provide for judicial review.196  The law does 
not provide for or outline a clear standard by which courts should review 
OFAC regulations, policy statements, or enforcement, other than those 
provided for under the default standards of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).197  The APA does not explicitly furnish a cause of action, so any 
party seeking to challenge OFAC’s determination or enforcement would 
have to invoke another statute to challenge the action in court.198  
Significantly, IEEPA provides no such cause of action.199  Therefore, a party 
can only challenge the procedure of the agency’s actions, rather than the 
merits of its decision.200 
It has been argued that the omission of explicit judicial review provisions 
acts as a signpost to courts that the legislature did not contemplate extensive 
judicial review.201  As such, courts may view the omission as further 
evidence that conducting a review of the merits of OFAC decisions is outside 
of their duty.202 
2.  What Is the Standard of Review? 
Because IEEPA does not provide for judicial review independently, any 
action OFAC takes pursuant to IEEPA is reviewed according to the APA.203  
Thus, courts review an OFAC designation or inclusion on the SDN List by 
examining whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of 
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 195. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 196. See 50 U.S.C. § 1706. 
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discretion, or in violation of statutory authority.204  Moreover, any judicial 
review under this standard is circumscribed to a review of the administrative 
record.205  Indeed, the APA does not require agencies to hold a hearing or to 
make formal findings of fact when rendering any decisions.206  As such, 
unless some other applicable law would require it, courts must limit their 
review of OFAC actions to OFAC’s administrative record and any 
contemporaneous addenda made by the agency.207 
The D.C. Court of Appeals commented on this weak standard of review in 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Department of 
State208:  “We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material 
before the Secretary is or is not true.  As we wrote earlier, the [administrative] 
record consists entirely of hearsay, none of it was ever subjected to adversary 
testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the 
organizations affected.”209  Despite this recognition of the possible 
inadequacies of the administrative record, the court adhered to its limited 
function of review and deferred to the agency’s determination in that case.210 
Similarly, the courts have been loath to substitute their judgment for the 
government’s judgment as to what material should remain confidential in 
sanctions proceedings.211  The courts have accepted the argument that they 
are not best placed to determine which items of information should remain 
classified and which could be disclosed without risking national security.212 
In any review of agency action under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
standard, courts need not find that the agency’s decision is “the only 
reasonable one, or even that it is the result [the court] would have reached 
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had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.”213  The 
reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the 
presumably more expert agency.214  In particular, courts reviewing OFAC 
determinations recognize a standard of high deference because OFAC acts 
“in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and 
administrative law.”215 
This deference to OFAC is consistent with a grander judicial tradition of 
truncating consideration of matters that implicate foreign affairs.216  This 
judicial deference has been likened to a siren song to which federal judges 
are drawn when asked to rule on delicate or controversial matters.217  
However, this automatic deference may not always be justified.218  
Moreover, at least one scholar has argued that courts’ abdication of their 
responsibility to hear cases simply because the matter touches on foreign 
affairs is inconsistent with the Constitution.219 
III.  MOVING TOWARD A BETTER SYSTEM 
While the current system does not provide many options for recourse to 
individuals or companies caught in the crosshairs of conflicting secondary 
sanctions regimes, several solutions are possible that may change the current 
system for the better.  Each of the possible solutions should not be viewed in 
isolation.  A combination of efforts on the following fronts will be most 
successful in mitigating the confusion surrounding secondary sanctions. 
A.  Recommendations 
The following recommendations are intended to improve the system of 
secondary sanctions.  Through these recommendations for heightened 
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a case is taken up, “saying what the law is” without deferring to other parts of the 
government simply because the matter deals with foreign affairs. 
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 217. Id. at 177. 
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judicial review and increased agency transparency, individuals and business 
entities will have greater confidence in their operations around the world. 
1.  Heightened Judicial Review 
While OFAC’s actions may being challenged under an arbitrary and 
capricious review of the agency’s determinations, such challenges have been 
largely unsuccessful.220  Similarly, the agency’s lack of transparency in the 
sanctioning process may be alleged to violate either the constitutional 
protection of due process or the principle of nondelegation.221  However, 
these challenges have also been largely unsuccessful.222 
First, because IEEPA does not provide for judicial review,223 any 
challenge to OFAC’s agency actions is reviewed pursuant to the APA.224  
However, because the APA does not explicitly furnish a cause of action,225 
and IEEPA does not provide one,226 the party seeking review can only 
challenge the procedure of the agency’s actions, rather than the merits of its 
decision.227 
While the APA acts as a fail-safe measure to ensure judicial review of 
agency actions where relevant statutes may not explicitly provide for such 
review, it is a weak fail-safe.  Due to the minimal requirements within the 
APA for the agency record, any judicial review of an OFAC determination 
is based on a record that may be wholly unsatisfactory, lacking information 
to enable the adversely affected party to make arguments and present 
evidence.228 
Moreover, IEEPA’s omission of an explicit provision for judicial review 
signals to courts that the legislature may not have contemplated extensive 
judicial review because Congress would normally have provided for such in 
the relevant statute.229  Accordingly, courts may believe it is outside of their 
province to conduct reviews of the merits of OFAC decisions.230 
Further, the lack of success in challenging OFAC’s actions is partially due 
to the amount of deference afforded to the agency by the courts simply by 
virtue of OFAC operating in foreign affairs.231  This high level of deference 
complicates and largely nullifies any legal challenges to OFAC’s actions.232 
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The executive branch’s assumption of the hegemonic role in American 
foreign relations should trigger the constitutional check of the other 
branches.233  Specifically, the federal judiciary can and should play a key role 
in balancing the power of the executive.  The federal judiciary should halt its 
current trend of refusing to duly consider cases that implicate foreign 
affairs.234  Rather than automatic deference to the executive agency operating 
in foreign affairs, the federal judiciary should recognize the unique risk posed 
for adversely affected parties by an executive agency with unfettered 
discretion.235  It is incumbent upon the federal judiciary to reprise its role as 
a check on the executive branch’s power in foreign affairs.236 
To assist the federal judiciary in bucking its current trend of deference to 
agencies involved in foreign affairs, Congress could further amend 
IEEPA.237  In its current state, there is no explicit provision for judicial 
review and thus the default arbitrary and capricious review provided for in 
the APA applies.238  An amendment to IEEPA should provide explicitly for 
a searching judicial review of executive actions taken pursuant to the statute.  
With such an amendment, Congress would telegraph to the judiciary that 
OFAC’s actions may warrant a more searching review, notwithstanding 
OFAC’s role in foreign affairs. 
2.  Clearer Administrative Guidance and Heightened Transparency 
In their current state, OFAC’s procedures lack sufficient transparency, 
even under the APA, to allow for sufficient judicial review and appeal by 
materially harmed parties.239 
Because OFAC has little incentive to self-adjust, as it continues operating 
unchecked by the courts, Congress may again assist in moving toward more 
transparency.  In its current state, IEEPA allows the president a significant 
amount of discretion in economic sanctions.240  The president subsequently 
has delegated much of this power to OFAC.241  A heightened standard of 
transparency could be exacted from OFAC if Congress were to recognize the 
delegation and explicitly provide for more transparent rulemaking 
procedures, including appeals processes for those targeted with secondary 
sanctions. 
3.  Alternative Solutions Under International Law 
A possible alternative to domestic self-correction in the U.S. sanctions 
regime is one that utilizes the international institutions and treaties that the 
 
 233. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra Part II.C. 
 239. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
2020] CAUGHT IN THE ECONOMIC CROSSHAIRS 1029 
United States was so critical in establishing.  International treaties on trade 
and commerce may provide a viable path to avoiding a sanctions war.  For 
example, Europe’s complaint to the WTO and WTO-facilitated negotiations 
with the Clinton administration were successful in nullifying heavy-handed 
secondary sanctions.242 
This multilateral approach is viable, but the alternative argument is that 
the United States is not actually engaging in reprehensible extraterritorial 
sanctioning but rather, simply benefiting from the indirect effect of 
businesses adhering to American foreign policy.  Indeed, some argue that 
using economic sanctions is well within the sovereign authority of a nation 
and any indirect impact on international commerce is still preferable to the 
coercive use of force.243 
B.  Weighing the Recommendations:  What Is Most Viable? 
While international pressure and diplomacy have proven effective 
before,244 this Note argues that this is the least viable solution under the 
current circumstances.  The United States is enjoying unprecedented 
domination of the global financial system and maintains its dominance in its 
rate of consumption of goods and services.245  This highly leveraged position 
allows the United States to confidently enact secondary sanctions that 
adversely impact its allies, without fear of damaging diplomatic 
retribution.246  It is unlikely the EU would successfully turn back the trend 
of increasingly common secondary sanctions while its businesses remain so 
heavily dependent on access to the U.S. markets.247 
It is more likely that a combination of judicial, administrative, and 
legislative reform would be the most potent in improving the system of 
secondary sanctions.  Mitigating the chilling effect that secondary sanctions 
and their conflict with European blocking regulations have had248 and 
threaten to have will involve proactive steps from within all three branches 
of the U.S. government.  An explicit mandate for heightened judicial review 
of actions undertaken pursuant to IEEPA will require congressional 
amendment of the law.  The judicial branch must follow suit and alter its 
tradition of automatic deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs.  
Finally, the executive branch itself can alter its current procedures from 
within, increasing the transparency of OFAC’s determinations and 
enforcement of secondary sanctions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the system surrounding secondary sanctions should be 
reformed.  The system’s lack of clarity and lack of sufficient judicial review 
is arguably unconstitutional.  Moreover, parties with global operations face 
both uncertainty and potentially severe liability under the current state of the 
law.  Recognizing that an increasing proportion of modern transactions 
involve myriad parties from many different countries, including those who 
may be affiliated with sanctioned nations, the United States should reform its 
current system to mitigate the confusion and risk associated with these 
transactions.  The issue intensifies when this opaque system finds itself in 
direct conflict with European blocking regulations.  This legal conflict with 
some of the United States’s closest allies and trading partners should further 
motivate reform from within.  Reform via heightened judicial review and 
clearer administrative procedures will encourage the flow of capital and 
goods and services, as well as improve relations with Europe. 
